RT Generic
T1 Board Independence, CEO Pay, and Camouflaged Compensation
A1 Ruiz-Verdú, Pablo
A1 Singh, Ravi
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa, 
AB We study how directors' reputational concerns influence executive compensation and the use ofcamouflaged forms of pay. We show that, in order to signal their independence to investors,boards lower managers' pay, but may also pay managers in hidden ways or structure compensationinefficiently. We also show that independent boards are more likely to make use of hiddencompensation than manager-friendly boards. We apply our model to study the costs and benefitsof greater pay transparency and of measures, such as say-on-pay initiatives, that increase boards'accountability to shareholders
SN 2341-0795
YR 2014
FD 2014-03
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10016/18864
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/18864
LA eng
NO Pablo Ruiz-Verdú gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Science andInnovation, through grant ECO2009/08278, of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness,through grant ECO2012-33308, and of the UCEIF Foundation, through the 2013 Santander FinancialInstitute Research Grant
DS e-Archivo
RD 28 abr. 2024