RT Generic
T1 Information advantage in common-value classic Tullock contests
A1 Aiche, A.
A1 Einy, Ezra
A1 Haimanko, Ori
A1 Moreno, Diego
A1 Selay, A.
A1 Shitovitz, Benyamin
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
A2 , 
AB We show that in a common-value classic Tullock contests with incomplete information a player's information advantage is rewarded. Interestingly, in two-player contests both players exert the same expected effort. We characterize the equilibrium of two-player contests in which a player has information advantage, and show that this player exerts a larger effort and wins the price with a larger probability the larger is the realized value of the prize, although he wins the prize less frequently than his opponent. In addition, we find that players may exert more effort in a Tullock contest than in an all-pay auction.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2016
FD 2016-11
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/23939
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/23939
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 30 abr. 2024