RT Journal Article
T1 Quarterly earnings guidance and real earnings management
A1 García Osma, Beatriz
A1 Guillamon-Saorin, Encarna
A1 Mercado, Facundo
AB We examine if quarterly earnings guidance induces real earnings management. Quarterly guidance may cause myopia and inefficient decision-making, if managers become overly concerned with setting and beating short-term earnings targets. We test these associations on a large sample of US firms. Our evidence suggests that quarterly guidance is informative and lowers myopic incentives. However, our analyses also reveal endogenous associations exist between guidance and real earnings management. In contrast with existing concerns over frequent guiders, we find that guidance appears problematic in infrequent guiders, and in firms that issue good news earnings guidance and that operate in settings where earnings pressures are high.
PB Wiley
SN 0306-686X
YR 2023
FD 2023-05-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/38459
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/38459
LA eng
NO European Social Fund, Grant/Award Number:S2015/HUM-3417; Spanish Ministry ofInnovation and Science, Grant/Award Number:ECO2016-77579
DS e-Archivo
RD 20 may. 2024