RT Journal Article
T1 The shared reward dilemma
A1 Cuesta, José A.
A1 Jiménez Recaredo, Raúl José
A1 Sánchez, Angel
A1 Lugo, Haydeé
AB One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the prisoner's dilemma (PD). Specifically, for a group of players that collect payoffs by playing a pairwise PD game with their partners, we consider an external entity that distributes a fixed reward equally among all cooperators. Thus, individuals confront a new dilemma: on the one hand, they may be inclined to choose the shared reward despite the possibility of being exploited by defectors; on the other hand, if too many players do that, cooperators will obtain a poor reward and defectors will outperform them. By appropriately tuning the amount to be shared a vast variety of scenarios arises, including the traditional ones in the study of cooperation as well as more complex situations where unexpected behavior can occur. We provide a complete classification of the equilibria of the n-player game as well as of its evolutionary dynamics.
PB Elsevier
SN 0022-5193
YR 2008
FD 2008-03-21
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7199
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7199
LA eng
NO 11 pages, 5 figures.-- ArXiv pre-print available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/0707.2587
NO Final publisher version available Open Access at: http://gisc.uc3m.es/~cuesta/papers-year.html
NO This work is partially supported by Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Spain) under Grants Ingenio-MATHEMATICA, MOSAICO, and NAN2004-9087-C03-03 and by Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) under Grants SIMUMAT-CM and MOSSNOHO-CM.
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RD 1 sept. 2024