RT Generic
T1 An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups
A1 Cabrales Goitia, Antonio
A1 Lugo, Haydeé
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2011
FD 2011-03
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/10602
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/10602
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024