RT Generic
T1 Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
A1 Lester, Benjamin
A1 Visschers, Ludo
A1 Wolthoff, Ronald
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we allow for a generalmeeting technology and show that its properties crucially affect the mechanism that sellersselect in equilibrium. In general, it is optimal for sellers to post an auction without a reserveprice but with a fee, paid by all buyers who meet with the seller. However, we define a novelcondition on meeting technologies, which we call invariance, and show that meeting fees areequal to zero if and only if this condition is satisfied. Finally, we discuss how invariance isrelated to other properties of meeting technologies identified in the literature.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2014
FD 2014-01-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/18875
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/18875
LA eng
NO Ludo Visschers gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Juan de la Cierva Grant; project grant ECO2010-20614 (Dirección general de investigación científica y técnica), and the Bank of Spain’s Programa de Investigación de Excelencia.
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024