RT Journal Article
T1 Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Non-Cooperative Games
A1 Ferreira, José Luis
AB In this paper we extend the definitions of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and communication-proof equilibrium to situations of partial communication. Then we use the model of endogenous formation of coalitions of Aumann and Myerson to find that one of these situations in which the corresponding equilibrium exists will be endogenously determined by the players in the game
PB Elsevier
SN 0899-8256
YR 1999
FD 1999-01
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5139
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5139
LA eng
NO Financial support by DGES (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Spain), through projects PB95-0287 and UE95-0042 is gratefully acknowledged.
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RD 28 abr. 2024