RT Journal Article
T1 Robust implementation under alternative information structures
A1 Corchón, Luis C.
A1 Ortuño, Ignacio
AB In this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbors and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the environment. We consider two different informational frameworks. In the firts, agents do not have priors about the relevant characteristics in the rest of the environment. In the second, agents are supposed to have priors about the unknown characteristics. We present a mechinism which implements any social choice correspondence satisfying monotonicity and no veto powe in both informational settings for every possible prior thus requiring little knowledge from the point of view ofthe desinner of the information possessed by agents about the environment.
PB Springer
SN 1434-4750
YR 1995
FD 1995
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4191
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4191
LA eng
NO The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
DS e-Archivo
RD 28 abr. 2024