RT Generic
T1 The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information
A1 Einy, Ezra
A1 Moreno, Diego
A1 Shitovitz, Benyamin
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB We study the Mas-Collel bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the "joint information» of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy.
SN 2340-5031
YR 1999
FD 1999-02
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/6120
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/6120
LA eng
NO Einy acknowledges the flnancial support of the UniversidadCarlos III de Madrid. Moreno acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry of Education(DGICYT), grant PB97-0091. Shitovitz acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry ofEducation, grant SAB98-0059.
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RD 18 may. 2024