RT Journal Article
T1 Tax enforcement problems
A1 Marhuenda, Francisco
A1 Ortuño Ortín, Ignacio
AB We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal-agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. We prove that, for a large family of penalty functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection.
PB Blackwell
SN 1467-9442 (Online)
YR 1997
FD 1997
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4178
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4178
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 27 jul. 2024