RT Journal Article
T1 A capture theory of committees
A1 Name Correa, Álvaro
A1 Yildirim, Huseyin
AB Why do committees exist? The extant literature emphasizes that they pool dispersed information across members. In this paper, we argue that they may also serve to discourage outside influence or capture by raising its cost. As such, committees may contain members who are uninformed or who add no new information to the collective decision. We show that the optimal committee is larger when outsiders have larger stakes in its decision or contribute lower-quality proposals, or when its members are more corruptible. We also show that keeping committee members anonymous and accountable for their votes helps deter capture.
PB Springer
SN 0048-5829
YR 2018
FD 2018-10-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34838
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34838
LA eng
NO Financial support from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation, Grant #ECO2013-42710-P, and Juan de la Cierva Fellowship (Name-Correa) as well as the dean’s research fund at Duke University (Yildirim) are greatly appreciated
DS e-Archivo
RD 18 may. 2024