RT Generic
T1 Implementation of the Walrassian Correspondance by Market Games
A1 Corchón, Luis C.
A1 Wilkie, Simon
K1 Mechanism
K1 Market Games
K1 Nash Equilibrium
K1 Strong Equilibrium
K1 Implementation
AB In this paper we present a set ofaxioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria aH coincide in the framework of market games.
PB IVIE
YR 1995
FD 1995
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4327
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4327
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 30 abr. 2024