RT Journal Article
T1 An economic analysis of corporate directors' fiduciary duties
A1 Gutiérrez, María
AB I present a principal-agent model where the shareholders (principal) can take legal action against the director (agent). The court's decision provides a verifiable but costly and imperfect signal on the director's fulfilment of his fiduciary duties. The director's remuneration can be made contingent not only on performance but also upon the court's decision. I show that when damage awards are high enough, the widespread use of liability insurance and limited-liability provisions that is observed in the United States is optimal because it allows for a more efficient litigation strategy to be ex post rational for the shareholders.
PB Wiley-Blackwell
SN 07416261
YR 2003
FD 2003
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7658
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7658
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024