RT Generic
T1 Contingent Commodities and Implementation
A1 Subir, Chattopadhyay
A1 Corchón, Luis C.
A1 Naeve, Jörg
K1 Contingent Commodities
K1 Implementation
K1 Single-Crossing
AB In this note we consider the problem whether contingent commodity allocations can be used when the states are not directly contractible. In such a setting a contigent commodity allocation takes the form of a social choice funtion, and the question in whether this function is implementable (in the sense of full implementation). Using only very mild assumptions on the rule for selecting contingent commodity allocations, we  derive a strnog negative result which also proves to be robust with respect to different solution concepts employed for implementation. These findings have interesting implications for the interpretation of Arrow-Debreu economies
PB Universidad de Bonn
YR 1998
FD 1998
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/3609
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/3609
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 3 may. 2024