RT Journal Article
T1 Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
A1 Hagen, Martin Norbert
A1 Hernando, Ángel
AB A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, (ii) ex-post individual rationality and (iii) ex-post budget balance if and only if it is a posted-price mechanism. A similar, more general result holds if (iii) is replaced by ex-post collusion-proofness and a no-free lunch condition. We provide a unified proof of both findings via the property of non-bossiness.
PB Elsevier
SN 0022-0531
YR 2021
FD 2021-09-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/35479
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/35479
LA eng
NO We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, grants MDM 2014-0431 and ECO2015-68406-P, as well as from Comunidad de Madrid, grant MadEco-CM.
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024