RT Journal Article
T1 How Evolutionary Dynamics Affects Network Reciprocity in Prisoner's Dilemma
A1 Cimini, Giulio
A1 Sánchez, Angel
AB Cooperation lies at the foundations of human societies, yet why people cooperate remains a conundrum. The issue, known as network reciprocity, of whether population structure can foster cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been addressed by many, but theoretical studies have yielded contradictory results so far—as the problem is very sensitive to how players adapt their strategy. However, recent experiments with the prisoner's dilemma game played on different networks and in a specific range of payoffs suggest that humans, at least for those experimental setups, do not consider neighbors' payoffs when making their decisions, and that the network structure does not influence the final outcome. In this work we carry out an extensive analysis of different evolutionary dynamics, taking into account most of the alternatives that have been proposed so far to implement players' strategy updating process. In this manner we show that the absence of network reciprocity is a general feature of the dynamics (among those we consider) that do not take neighbors' payoffs into account. Our results, together with experimental evidence, hint at how to properly model real people's behavior
PB Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
SN 1460-7425
YR 2015
FD 2015-03-31
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21460
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21460
LA eng
NO This work was supported by the Swiss Natural Science Foundation through grant PBFRP2_145872 and by Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) through grant PRODIEVO.
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RD 27 jul. 2024