RT Journal Article
T1 Group key exchange protocols withstanding ephemeral-key reveals
A1 González Vasco, María Isabel
A1 Pérez Del Pozo, Ángel Luis
A1 Suarez Corona, Adriana
AB When a group key exchange protocol is executed, the session key is typically extracted from two types of secrets: long-term keys (for authentication) and freshly generated (often random) values. The leakage of this latter so-called ephemeral keys has been extensively analysed in the 2-party case, yet very few works are concerned with it in the group setting. The authors provide a generic group key exchange construction that is strongly secure, meaning that the attacker is allowed to learn both long-term and ephemeral keys (but not both from the same participant, as this would trivially disclose the session key). Their design can be seen as a compiler, in the sense that it builds on a 2-party key exchange protocol which is strongly secure and transforms it into a strongly secure group key exchange protocol by adding only one extra round of communication. When applied to an existing 2-party protocol from Bergsma et al., the result is a 2-round group key exchange protocol which is strongly secure in the standard model, thus yielding the first construction with this property.
PB Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET)
SN 1751-8709
YR 2018
FD 2018-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/39077
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/39077
LA eng
NO M.I. González Vasco and Ángel L. Pérez del Pozo are partially supported by research project MTM2013-41426-R and A. Suárez Corona is supported by MTM2013-45588-C3-1-P, both funded bythe Spanish MINECO.
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RD 17 jul. 2024