RT Generic
T1 Nonlinear Pricing with Self-Control Preferences
A1 Shum, Matthew
A1 Esteban, Susanna
A1 Miyagawa, Eiichi
A2 The Johns Hopkins University. Department of Economics, 
AB This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolist when consumers' preferences exhibit temptation and self-control as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001a). Consumers are subject to temptation inside the store but exercise self-control, and those foreseeing large self-control costs do not enter the store. Consumers di®er in their preferences under temptation. When all consumers are tempted by more expensive, higher quality choices, the optimal menu is a singleton, which saves consumers from self-control and extracts consumers' commitment surplus. When some consumers are tempted by cheaper, lower quality choices, the optimal menu may contain a continuum of choices.
YR 2003
FD 2003
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4995
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4995
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024