RT Journal Article
T1 Delegation and firms’ ability to collude
A1 Trombetta, Marco
A1 Lambertini, Luca
AB In amodel of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we showthat delegation has no effect on cartel stability if managers collude, while it may hinder cartel stability when owners collude in setting the incentive schemes. If owners can choose whether to delegate or keep control of their respective firms, and both groups of individuals collude or play non-cooperatively in their respective variables according to the level of intertemporal discount factor, then if managers are not able to collude in output levels, owners’ delegation decision is non-monotone in the discount factor.
PB Elsevier
SN 0167-2681
YR 2002
FD 2002-04
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10016/7347
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/7347
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 27 abr. 2024