RT Generic
T1 How to sell to buyers with crossholdings
A1 Loyola, Gino
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB This paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontalcrossholdings. We find that this mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against thestronger bidders so that the seller´s expected revenue is increasing in both thecommon crossholding and the degree of asymmetry in crossholdings. Furthermore, itcan be implemented by a sequential procedure that includes a price-preferencesscheme and the possibility of an exclusive deal with the weakest bidder. We also showthat a simple sequential negotiation mechanism, although suboptimal, yields a largerseller´s expected revenue than both the first-price and the second-price auctions.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2007
FD 2007-04-30
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10016/834
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10016/834
LA eng
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 27 abr. 2024