RT Generic
T1 Pigouvian Taxes: A Stratefic Approach
A1 Corchón, Luis C.
A1 Alcalde, J.
A1 Moreno, B.
K1 Pigouvian Taxes
K1 Mechanism Design
K1 Implementation
AB This papers analyzzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutiions in economies with externalities. We provide twosimple mechanisms implementating the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in enviorement in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in which agents are incompletely informed, and provide a mechanis that implements this social choice correspondence in Bayesian equilibrium.
PB Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas
SN 84-482-1333-5
YR 1996
FD 1996
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4089
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4089
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 9 may. 2024