RT Generic
T1 The stability and breakup of nations : a quantitative analysis
A1 Desmet, Klaus
A1 Le Breton, Michel
A1 Ortuño, Ignacio
A1 Weber, Shlomo
AB This paper presents a model of nations where agents vote on the optimal level of public spending. Larger nations bene t from increasing returns in the provision of public goods, but bear the costs of greater cultural heterogeneity. This tradeo induces agents' preferences over di fferent geographical con gurations, thus determining the likelihood of secessions or unions. After calibrating the model to Europe, we identify the regions prone to secession and the countries most likely to merge. As a test of the theory, we show that the model can account for the breakup of Yugoslavia and the dynamics of its disintegration. We also provide empirical support for the use of genetic distances as a proxy for cultural heterogeneity.
YR 2009
FD 2009-06
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4806
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4806
LA eng
NO Financial aid from the Spanish Ministry of Science (ECO2008-01300) and the Fundación BBVA 3-04X isgratefully acknowledged
DS e-Archivo
RD 19 may. 2024