RT Generic
T1 Vertical integration, knowledge disclosure and decreasing rival's cost
A1 Milliou, Chrysovalantou
A1 Petrakis, Emmanuel
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB We study vertical integration incorporating the fact that it creates the possibility of knowledge disclosure. We consider a setting where, through integrating, an upstream monopolist learns its downstream partner’s innovation, and can disclose it to its downstream rival. We show that a vertically integrated firm chooses to fully disclose its knowledge to its downstream rival. Knowledge disclosure intensifies downstream competition but, at the same time, expands the downstream market size. We also show that, due to knowledge disclosure, vertical integration increases firms’ innovation incentives, consumer and total welfare, and decreases, instead of raises, the rival’s cost.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2012
FD 2012-04
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/14160
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/14160
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 18 may. 2024