RT Generic
T1 On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership
A1 Alipranti, Maria
A1 Petrakis, Emmanuel
A1 Skartados, Panagiotis
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB We consider a vertically related market in which an upstream monopolist supplier trades, via interim observable two-part tariff contracts, with two differentiated goods' downstream Cournot competitors. We show that passive partial backward ownership (PPBO) may be pro-competitive and welfare enhancing. PPBO exacerbates the upstream's commitment problem and yields lower wholesale prices, and higher industry output, consumers surplus, and welfare than in the absence of PPBO.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2021
FD 2021-09-14
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/33271
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/33271
LA eng
NO Petrakis acknowledges financial support from “UC3M-Santander Chairs of Excellence"
DS e-Archivo
RD 16 jul. 2024