RT Journal Article
T1 Social and strategic imitation: the way to consensus
A1 Vilone, Daniele
A1 Ramasco, José J.
A1 Sánchez, Angel
A1 San Miguel, Maxi
AB Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends or acquaintances without any strategic consideration. We explore here the interplay between strategic and social imitative behavior in a coordination problem on a social network. We observe that for interactions on 1D and 2D lattices any amount of social imitation prevents the freezing of the network in domains with different conventions, thus leading to global consensus. For interactions on complex networks, the interplay of social and strategic imitation also drives the system towards global consensus while neither dynamics alone does. We find an optimum value for the combination of imitative behaviors to reach consensus in a minimum time, and two different dynamical regimes to approach it: exponential when social imitation predominates, power-law when strategic considerations prevail.
PB Macmillan
SN 2045-2322
YR 2012
FD 2012-09
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21358
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21358
LA eng
NO The project FISICOS (FIS2007-60327) of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiviness (MINECO). J. J. R. receives funding also from the MINECO through the Ramón y Cajal program and through the project MODASS. And  grants MOSAICO, PRODIEVO and Complexity-NET RESINEE of MINECO and MODELICO-CM of Comunidad de Madrid.
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RD 1 may. 2024