RT Journal Article
T1 Adversarial risk analysis for bi-agent influence diagrams: an algorithmic approach
A1 González Ortega, Jorge
A1 Ríos  Insua, David
A1 Cano, Javier
AB We describe how to support a decision maker who faces an adversary. To that end, we consider general interactions entailing sequences of both agents' decisions, some of them possibly being simultaneous or repeated across time. We model their joint problem as a bi-agent influence diagram. Unlike previous solutions framed under a standard game-theoretic perspective, we provide a decision-analytic methodology to support the decision maker based on an adversarial risk analysis paradigm. This allows the avoidance of non-realistic strong common knowledge assumptions typical of non-cooperative game theory as well as a better apportion of uncertainty sources. We illustrate the methodology with a schematic critical infrastructure protection problem
PB Elsevier
SN 0377-2217
YR 2019
FD 2019-03-16
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/37850
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/37850
LA eng
NO The work of DRI is supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Innovation program MTM2014-56949-C3-1-R, the ESF-COST Action IS1304 on Expert Judgement and the AXA-ICMAT Chair on Adversarial Risk Analysis. Besides, JGO’s research is financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under FPI SO grant agreement BES-2015-072892. This work has received funding from the European Union’s H2020 Program for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration under grant agreement no. 740920 and has also been partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the “Severo Ochoa” Program for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0554). We are very grateful to the suggestions of the referees.
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024