RT Dissertation/Thesis
T1 Essays on auction theory
A1 Loyola Fuentes, Gino Gustavo
AB This paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presenceof horizontal crossholdings. We find that the optimal mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller's expected revenue is increasing in both the common crossholding and the degree of asymmetry in crossholdings. Furthermore, it can be implemented by a sequential procedure that includes a price-preferences scheme and the possibility of an exclusive deal with the weakest bidder. We also show that a simple sequential negotiation mechanism, although suboptimal, yields a larger seller's expected revenue than both the first-price and the second-price auctions
YR 2008
FD 2008-04
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5244
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5244
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 24 may. 2024