RT Journal Article
T1 Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina's long-run decline
A1 Prados de la Escosura, Leandro
A1 Sanz Villarroya, Isabel
AB Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s “contract intensive money” (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline.
PB Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
SN 1863-2505
SN 1863-2513
YR 2009
FD 2009-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4677
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4677
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 29 may. 2024