RT Journal Article
T1 The quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources
A1 Cabrales, Antonio
A1 Hauk, Esther
AB We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources, which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. It also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed. This finding is corroborated in cross-section regressions.
PB Wiley-Blackwell
SN 0013-0133
YR 2010
FD 2010-11-23
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/12989
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/12989
LA eng
NO We gratefully acknowledgefinancial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under grants CONSOLIDERINGENIO2010 (CSD2006-0016), SEJ2006-01717 and SEJ2006-11665-C02-00.
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RD 8 may. 2024