RT Generic
T1 Stability in one-sided matching markets
A1 Cechlárová, Katarína
A1 Romero-Medina, Antonio
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation, when it is allowed to form groups of any size (the stable partition problem). Two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets are suggested. For the first one, derived from the most prefered member of a set, it is shown that a stable partition always existis if the original preferences are strict and a simple algorithm for its computation is derived. This algorithm turns out to be strategy proof. The second extension, based on the least prefered member of a set, produces solutions very similar to those for the stable roornmates problem.
SN 2340-5031
YR 1998
FD 1998-07
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4158
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4158
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 20 may. 2024