RT Generic
T1 Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
A1 Romero-Medina, Antonio
A1 Triossi, Matteo
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB This paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed tosend multiple applications to colleges and colleges sequentially decide the applicantsto enroll. The irreversibility of agents decisions and the sequential structure of theenrollments make truthful behavior a dominant strategy for colleges. Due to thesefeatures, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame PerfectNash equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a mechanism where colleges makeproposals to potential students and students decide sequentially. We show that thismechanism implements the stable set as well.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2010
FD 2010-09
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/9275
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/9275
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 14 sept. 2024