RT Journal Article
T1 Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing under Economies to Scale
A1 Frutos, María Ángeles de
AB We consider the problem of cost sharing in the presence of increasing returns to scale and potential strategic behavior on the part of consumers. We show that any smooth and strictly monotonic mechanism for which a Nash equilibrium exists for all profiles of convex and monotonic preferences must be dictatorial. However, we propose a cost sharing mechanism, the decreasing serial mechanism, for which an interesting domain restriction ensures existence of a noncooperative equilibrium for its cost sharing game. A characterization theorem of the mechanism based on the strategic properties of existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of its noncooperative equilibrium is provided.
PB Elsevier
SN 0022-0531
YR 1998
FD 1998
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4414
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4414
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 19 may. 2024