RT Journal Article
T1 Price support by bank-affiliated mutual funds
A1 Golez, Benjamin
A1 Marin, Jose M.
AB Fund managers are double agents; they serve both fund investors and owners of management firms. This conflict of interest may result in trading to support securities prices. Tests of this hypothesis in the Spanish mutual fund industry indicate that bank-affiliated mutual funds systematically increase their holdings in the controlling bank stock around seasoned equity issues, at the time of bad news about the controlling bank, before anticipated price drops, and after non-anticipated price drops. The results seem mainly driven by bank managers' incentives. Ownership of asset management companies thus matters and can distort capital allocation and asset prices. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
PB Elsevier
SN 0304-405X
YR 2015
FD 2015-03
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21704
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21704
LA eng
NO Both authorsacknowledge Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of the Economy and Competitiveness (MEC GrantECO2012-39423)
DS e-Archivo
RD 18 may. 2024