RT Generic
T1 Credible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall
A1 Corcho, Paula
A1 Ferreira, José Luis
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB Credible equilibria were defined in Ferreira, Gilboa and Maschler (1995) to handle situations of preferences changing along time in a model given by an extensive form game. This paper extends the definition to the case of infinite games and, more important, to games with nonperfect recall. These games are of great interest in possible applications of the model, but the original definition was not applicable to them. The difficulties of this extension are solved by using some ideas in the literatue of abstract systems and by proposing new ones that may prove useful in more general settings.
SN 2340-5031
YR 1997
FD 1997-05
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/6025
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/6025
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 19 may. 2024