RT Generic
T1 Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
A1 Romero-Medina, Antonio
A1 Triossi, Matteo
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB This paper analyzes the role of acyclicity in singleton cores. We show that the absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Furthermore, acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores. If firms or workers preferences are acyclical, unique stable matching is obtained through a procedure that resembles a serial dictatorship. Thus, acyclicity generalizes the notion of common preferences. It follows that if the firms or workers preferences are acyclical, unique stable matching is strongly efficient for the other side of the market
SN 2340-5031
YR 2011
FD 2011-08-19
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/12071
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/12071
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 17 jul. 2024