RT Generic
T1 Norms and the evolution of leaders' followership
A1 Cabrales Goitia, Antonio
A1 Hauk, Esther
AB In this paper we model the interaction between leaders, their followers and crowd followers in a coordination game with local interaction. The steady states of a dynamic best-response process can feature a coexistence of Pareto dominant and risk dominant actions in the population. The existence of leaders and their followers, plus the local interaction, which leads to clustering, is crucial for the survival of the Pareto dominant actions. The evolution of leader and crowd followership shows that leader followership can also be locally stable around Pareto dominant leaders. The paper answers the questions (i) which Leader should be removed and (ii) how to optimally place leaders in the network to enhance payoff dominant play.
YR 2022
FD 2022-07-12
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/35968
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/35968
LA eng
NO Esther Hauk acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación through research project PID2021-126200NB-I00. Antonio Cabrales acknowledges the financial help of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 891124. We are also gratefulfor the comments of seminar audiences at NEAT (Padova/Venice) and the Barcelona BSE forum
DS e-Archivo
RD 17 jul. 2024