RT Generic
T1 Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria
A1 Cabrales, Antonio
A1 Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, 
AB This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on theirallocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large andtestable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities tofirms. We show that even small deviations from purely “selfish” preferences leads towidespread workplace skill segregation. This result holds for a broad class anddistribution of social preferences. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work indifferent firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers whoare “close”.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2007
FD 2007-03
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/674
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/674
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 may. 2024