RT Journal Article
T1 Optimal Price of Entry into a Competition
A1 Ginzburg, Boris
AB A continuum of contestants are choosing whether to enter a competition. Each contestant has a type, and of those who enter, the ones with highest types receive prizes. A profit-maximizing firm controls entry, and charges a price for it. I show that an increase in the value of each prize leads the firm to raise the price while keeping the intensity of entry fixed. Conversely, when the mass of prizes increases, the firm initially keeps the price constant while allowing entry to increase; and later-raises the price.
PB John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
SN 0095-2583
YR 2021
FD 2021-01-01
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/35428
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/35428
LA eng
NO Support from Comunidad de Madrid (grant S2015/HUM-3444) is gratefully acknowledged.
DS e-Archivo
RD 27 jul. 2024