RT Generic
T1 Exclusive dealing and compatibility of investments
A1 Milliou, Chrysovalantou
AB We examine a final product manufacturer's incentives to engage in exclusive dealing with an input supplier when both market sides invest in quality and bargain over their trading terms. Taking into account that the investments' compatibility can be higher under exclusive dealing we find, in contrast to previous literature, that bargaining power distribution plays a crucial role both for investment incentives and for incentives to adopt exclusive dealing. We also find that there exist cases in which although investments are higher under exclusive dealing, the manufacturer chooses non-exclusive dealing. Our welfare analysis indicates that the manufacturer's choice of exclusive dealing in equilibrium is never welfare detrimental.
SN 2340-5031
YR 2004
FD 2004-10
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/326
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/326
LA eng
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 3 may. 2024