RT Generic
T1 Executive transitions, firm performance, organizational survival al and the nature of the principal-agent contract
A1 Gutiérrez, Isabel
A1 Núñez-Nickel, Manuel
A1 Gómez-Mejía, Luis R.
A2 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa, 
AB Using an agency framework, this study examines how executive transitions very according to the nature of therelationship between agent and principal, tirm performance, and the executive's relative power. Using the entirepopulation of Spanish newspapers during the period 1966-1993, we tind that declining performance is aprecursor of executive changes, but that the impact is much greater for the second person in command. Thissuggests that entrenchment allows the top executive to be relatively insulated from firm performance, yet holdhis/her subordinate accountable for that performance. We also find, contrary to an "scapegoat" or populationecology prediction, that executive changes have a positive impact on firm survival, and that the salutaryorganizational effect of managerial transitions is greatest for the top executive.
YR 1997
FD 1997-05
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7032
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7032
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 may. 2024