RT Journal Article
T1 An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games
A1 Moreno, Diego
A1 Wooders, John
AB This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the usefulness of alternative solution concepts to explain players' behavior in noncooperative games with preplay communication. In the experiment subjects communicate byplain conversationprior to playing a simple game. In this setting, we find that the presumption ofindividualisticandindependentbehavior underlying the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to becoordinatedandcorrelated. Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation of observed play. The coalition proof correlated equilibrium of the game, however, explains the data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced
PB Elsevier
SN 0899-8256
YR 1998
FD 1998
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4393
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4393
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 2 may. 2024