RT Journal Article
T1 Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria
A1 Cabrales, Antonio
A1 Antoni, Calvó-Armengol
AB This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely“selfish” preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are “close”. This result holds for a broad class and distribution of social preferences.
PB Elsevier
SN 0022-0531
YR 2008
FD 2008
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/3658
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/3658
LA eng
DS e-Archivo
RD 1 sept. 2024