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Labor Force Participation among Immigrants in 10 Western European Countries: Generation, Gender and Ethnicity

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Abstract

Using data from five European Social Surveys the study focuses on labor force incorporation of sub-groups of immigrants in 10 West-European countries. Whereas the analysis reveals that rate of labor force activity among first-generation immigrants is lower than that of comparable native-born populations regardless of ethnicity or gender, meaningful differences across sub-groups of second-generation immigrants are observed. Second-generation male and female immigrants of European origin achieve parity with native-born Europeans in rate of participation; by contrast, second-generation immigrant men and women of non-European origin and of the Muslim faith are less likely to become economically active than comparable Europeans.

Key words

Immigration, labor market, Europe, ethnicity.

Biographical notes

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1. Introduction

The flow of migrants to Western European countries in the post-WWII era is typically explained by an increase in demand for workers in Western Europe, on the one hand, and by a large supply of labor force outside Western Europe, on the other hand. The increased demand for workers in Western Europe has been attributed to rapid economic growth, rising educational levels, and declining fertility coupled with reluctance of the local population to take low-status, low-paying, menial jobs in labor markets. The demand for workers (mostly for cheap labor) in Western Europe was met by the supply of immigrants and labor migrants in poor and less-developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well in Eastern Europe. Indeed, immigration flows to Western Europe can be explained by the notion that immigrants are drawn from places where economic opportunities are depressed and where wages are low towards places where employment opportunities are abundant and wages are high (Massey et al, 1998; Stalker, 1994; Castles, 1986).

The influx of migrants to Europe has dramatically changed the ethnic fabric of most European countries. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, immigrants comprised 5.5 percent of the population of Western Europe. In fact, the relative size of the foreign-born population in many Western European countries ranges between 7 and 15 per-

cent (Salt, 2005). The ethnic origin of the foreign population varies across European countries reflecting, to a large extent, the regions from which workers have been recruited over the years and the particular historical links and bilateral relations of specific countries with former colonies, as well as the openness of specific countries to political refugees and asylum seekers (Castles and Miller 1993; Salt, 2005). Examining the patterns of migration flows into Europe for 1980-2004, Hooghe et al. (2008) suggested that these flows to Western European countries can be understood, first and foremost, as a reaction to economic incentives with regards to labor market outcomes. More specifically, Hooghe et al. (2008) found that immigrants did not systematically choose to move to the richest countries or countries with most generous social security or welfare systems; rather immigrants were attracted by shortages in the labor market of specific host countries (as well as by post-colonial linkages).

The rise in the size of immigrant populations and the presence of immigrants in society has become one of the most frequently discussed and debated issues in most West European countries. Consequently, social scientists have begun devoting increased attention to the study of immigrants in European societies. Recent studies on immigrants in Europe have focused on topics such as attitudes toward inclusion of immigrants and

their impact on society (e.g., Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2006; Scheepers et al., 2002), immigrants' patterns of residential segregation (e.g., Gilkman and Semyonov, 2012; Peach, 2005; Logan, 2006) and immigrants' incorporation into the labor market of the host society (e.g., Heath and Cheung, 2007; Van Turbergen, 2005a; Kogan, 2006), just to name a few.

Although there is now a substantial body of literature on incorporation of immigrants into the social and economic systems of European societies, no cross-national, systematic simultaneous examination of the differential impact of gender, generation, and ethnicity on integration of immigrants into the labor

market of the host societies exists. The omission of *simultaneous examination* of 'ethnicity' and 'generation' from this body of research cannot be attributed to shortsightedness of researchers but to unavailability of comparable cross-national data with detailed information on characteristics of both immigrants and their descendants. By drawing on recent data released by the European Social Survey, we aim to bridge this gap in the literature and to provide cross-national research on immigrants' incorporation into the labor market, in terms of active labor force participation, within the context of 10 West European countries while simultaneously examining the impact of gender, ethnic origin (as well as religious affiliation) and generation on economic participation of immigrants.

2. Previous Studies on Labor Force Participation of Immigrants in Europe

There are two major bodies of sociological research that focus on economic integration and labor force activity of immigrants in the labor market of European societies. The first body of research includes studies on incorporation of immigrants into a single national labor market (e.g., Bevelander (1999) and Edin, Fredriksson and Aslund (2003) for Sweden; Kogan (2004) for Germany; Kogan and Kalter (2006) for Austria; Model (1999) for England; Neels (2000) for Belgium; Zorlu and

Hartog (2002) for the Netherlands). The second body of research is composed of comparative cross-national analyses. Whereas several researchers limited the comparison to two or three national labor markets [e.g., Algan et al. (2009) for Germany, UK and France; Kesler (2006) for Britain, Germany and Sweden; and Kogan (2003) for Austria and Sweden), others examined integration of immigrants into the economic system across a relatively large number of countries (Adsera and Chiswick, 2007;

Heath and Cheung, 2007; Kogan 2006; Koopmans, 2010; Van Tubergen et al., 2004; Van Tubergen, 2005a; Van Tubergen 2005b).

More specifically, Adsera and Chiswick (2007) examined earnings of first-generation immigrants as compared with native workers in fifteen European countries. Heath and Cheung (2007) included in their study seven Western 'old immigration' European countries as well as traditional immigration countries such as the US, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and Israel and concentrated exclusively on second-generation immigrants. Kogan (2006) focused on fourteen Western 'old' and 'new immigration' countries to examine variations in labor force participation among recent immigrants to Europe (up to five years in the host country) and Koopmans (2010) studied the rate of employment among first-generation immigrants in eight Western European countries. Van Tubergen, Maas and Flap (2004) and Van Tubergen (2005a and 2005b) examined labor force participation, occupational status, and likelihood of being self-employed among first-generation immigrants across fifteen European countries plus Australia, Canada and the United States.

Notwithstanding the contribution of these studies to the immigration literature, no one has yet simultaneously examined the impact of ethnicity and generation on integration of male and female immigrants into the labor market

of host societies within a comparative framework. In other words, although all studies cited at the outset of this paper advanced both empirical and theoretical knowledge and contributed to a better understanding the integration process of immigrants into the European labor market, the dynamic aspects associated with generational differences and the impact of ethnicity are still missing from the immigration literature. This, indeed, is the major goal of the present research.

In what follows, thus, we take advantage of the five waves of the European Social Survey to compile a data set for first- and second-generation immigrants in ten European countries, in order to compare their labor force participation with that of native-born Europeans. More specifically, by examining the relative employment disadvantage/advantage (in comparison to natives) of first- and second-generation immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds and religious affiliations, the study attempts to investigate the intergenerational patterns of immigrants' labor force incorporation for various ethnic and religious groups in ten Western European 'old immigration' countries. To do so, we: First, draw hypothesis derived from theoretical models and previous research on the topic; second, describe the data and variables to be used in the analysis; third, present a descriptive overview of the findings and estimate a series of multivariate regression equations to examine the impact of generation and ethnicity on odds for

labor force participation; and fourth, discuss the findings in the light of so-

ciological literature and contemporary European society.

3. Theoretical Expectations and Hypotheses

Students of immigration have long observed that immigrants experience hardships in finding suitable employment upon arrival in the host country. The *classical assimilation model* attributes difficulties faced by immigrants in the labor market of the host society to immigrants' limited access to information and to social networks, restricted knowledge of the new society, inadequate professional skills, poor language proficiency, lack of possession of host-country educational credentials, and little or no host labor-market experience. Consequently, immigrants may suffer from unemployment or underemployment and often settle for lower status and lower-paid jobs than the ones they had in their country of origin (Borjas, 1994; Chiswick, 1978; Chiswick and Miller, 1988).

Indeed, previous research in western European countries has demonstrated that shortly after arrival immigrants are disadvantaged (when compared to native-born) in becoming economically active (e.g. Algan et.al. 2009; Kogan, 2006; Kesler, 2006) and in securing high-paying jobs. According to the classical assimilation model, first-generation immigrants experience substantial disadvantages in joining the economically active labor force. The

disadvantages tend to decline with passage of time in the new country; the disadvantages further decline among second-generation immigrants (Chiswick, 1978; Chiswick and Miller, 1988). This is because second-generation immigrants do not suffer from disruptions associated with the migration process. Presumably, second-generation immigrants have acquired the codes of the local culture, fluency of the host country's language, domestic educational credentials, and work experience in the host country (Heath, Rethon and Kilpi, 2008).

Following the logic of the classical assimilation model, *we expect employment disadvantage of immigrants (as compared to native-born persons) to be most evident among first-generation immigrants (Hypothesis 1a). We expect second-generation immigrants to achieve parity in term of active labor force participation with the native-born population or at least to experience substantially lower disadvantages (when compared to native-born persons) than first-generation immigrants (Hypothesis 1b).*

The classical assimilation model has received support from a large number of

studies and across a variety of immigrant societies. Nonetheless, proponents of the *segmented assimilation model* suggest that widespread changes in host societies and the growing diversity of immigrants in terms of social class and ethnicity have made the common linear model of integration less likely to fit the reality of contemporary societies (e.g., Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Raumbaut; 2005). According to the segmented assimilation model, the host society offers to different immigrant ethnic groups an inequitable distribution of possibilities and opportunities. While some groups have an abundance of opportunities, others face multiple disadvantages including discrimination and insufficient social and economic resources. As a result, whereas some groups may experience intergenerational economic upward mobility (either by assimilating into the mainstream of society or through ethnic cohesion), other groups (or at least a sizeable part of them) may experience downward assimilation (integration into the bottom segment of society) (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Raumbaut; 2005, Portes, Fernandez-Kelly and Haller, 2005). The logic embodied in the segmented assimilation model implies that immigrant groups of different ethnic and cultural origins would experience differential patterns of socioeconomic mobility and, hence, differential modes of incorporation into the labor market.

Although the segmented assimilation model emerged in the context of the US

(mostly concerning the children of immigrants who arrived to the US in the second decade of the twentieth century) it was recently applied to ethnic groups in Europe (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003; Thomson and Crul, 2007; de Graaf and van Zenderen, 2009). Research among European societies underscores differential patterns of integration and divergent patterns of intergenerational mobility across ethnic groups. The research also reveals varying levels of socioeconomic outcomes and differential adaptation processes across second-generation immigrant groups (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003; Thomson and Crul, 2007; Simon, 2003; Worbs, 2003). Indeed, the growing body of research on immigrants in Europe repeatedly demonstrates that in most European countries ethnic minorities, especially immigrants from non-European countries and those of the Muslim affiliation, are not only geographically concentrated, often in areas of relatively high social deprivation and scarce labor market opportunities (Mustered, 2005; Peach, 2005, Glikman and Semyonov, 2012) but they also experience difficulties in integrating into mainstream European society and its economy (Model 1999; Algan et al., 2009; Heath, Rethon and Kilpi, 2008). On the basis of these studies, it would be reasonable to expect that second-generation non-European immigrants, and especially immigrants of the Muslim religion, would be disadvantaged in entering the active labor force.

In line with the segmented assimilation model and previous research on immi-

grants' labor market incorporation in Europe, *we expect a different rate of labor force participation among European and non-European immigrants, especially among second-generation immigrants. More specifically, we expect second-generation European immigrants to achieve parity with the native-born population but we do not expect second-generation non-European and Muslim immigrants to achieve a similar rate of active labor force participation. In other words, we expect non-European and Muslim second-generation immigrants to experience greater disadvantage than other immigrants in entering the labor market (Hypotheses 2a).*

We also expect different patterns of labor market incorporation for immigrant men and women. The literature on immigration and gender underscores different rates of labor market incorporation for **men and women**, especially with regard to the ways that ethnic origin affects active labor market participation. Indeed, it is not only that immigrant women have a lower chance (in

comparison to either native-born women or immigrant men) to participate in economically active labor force; ethnicity of immigrants also interacts with gender to produce divergent patterns of labor force activity among immigrants (see for example, Raijman and Semyonov, 1997; Brown and Misra, 2003). Women who belong to traditional ethnic groups (mostly of non-European and Muslim origin) are more restricted in participation in the public sphere and therefore they are less likely to participate in the economically active labor force. The research literature suggests that non-European and Muslim women have to overcome cultural barriers and traditional gender roles in their ethnic community in order to join the labor market and become economically active (see, for example, Crul and Doornik, 2003). Considering these factors, *we expect non-European or Muslim immigrant women to be in the most disadvantageous position in terms of active labor force participation in comparison to all other immigrant groups, both men and women (Hypotheses 2b).*

4. Data and Variables

Data for the present analysis were obtained from the five rounds (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010) of the European Social Survey (ESS). The analysis was restricted to the ten Western European 'old-immigration' countries: Austria,

Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, UK, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. In each of the countries information was gathered from a random probability national sample of the eligible resident populations aged 15

and over¹. The analysis reported here was also restricted to the population in the age group 18-65. In order to increase the number of cases, mostly the number of immigrants², and in order to achieve more reliable statistical estimates, we pooled all five rounds into one sample, controlling for year of survey in the analysis (see list of countries and sample size in Appendix Table 1).

The ESS data provide us with the necessary information to construct a series of key variables that represent immigration status (i.e., first- and second-generation immigrants, and native-born European). Specifically, first-generation immigrants are those born outside the specific country and both of whose parents were born outside the country, or those born outside the specific country, do not hold the country's citizenship, and one of whose parents were born outside the country. Second-generation immigrants are those born in the specific European country but both of whose parents were born outside the country (whether or not they hold the country's

citizenship)³. Natives are those who hold the specific European country's citizenship and at least one of whose parents was born in the country. It is important to note that the data allow us to provide only cross-sectional analysis where time is represented by synthetic generational comparisons⁴.

We further divided the immigrant population by ethnic origin by distinguishing between European and non-European origin (father of the respondent was born in Europe, Australia or Northern America versus non-European)⁵ and by religious affiliation. Religious affiliation of respondents is classed into two major groups: Muslim and non-Muslim. In addition, a series of socio-demographic variables that are traditionally used as predictors of odds to take a part in economically active labor force were included in the analysis (mainly for con-

¹ The ESS was initiated and seed-funded by the European Science Foundation, the body representing almost all of Europe's main national academic funding agencies. The ESS Central Coordinating Team takes measures to ensure the comparability and validity of the ESS data. For more detailed information, see the ESS website: <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>.

² We are aware of the problems that a relatively small number of cases, especially second-generation Muslim immigrants, may create. At the same time, several robustness checks we have done, similarity of our results to those of previous studies, and lack of a larger comparative dataset at this moment, lead us to believe that the attempt to carry out our research on the base of the dataset at hand is worthwhile.

³ "Second-generation" also includes two additional small groups: 1) those born in the specific European country, do not hold the country's citizenship and one of whose parents was born in the country; and 2) those born in the specific European country, hold the country's citizenship, and one of whose parents was born outside the country .

⁴ Another limitation of the data analyzed above is the possible under-representation of undocumented migrants and migrants with poor host-country language skills, since irregular immigrants and immigrants with poor language skills tend not to be properly covered by regular national surveys.

⁵ The first round of the ESS provides us with information on father's continent of birth but does not specify father's country of birth. Consequently, we are not able to construct more precise category of origin that could be based on country of birth rather than on continent of birth. Furthermore, the number of immigrant respondents in the datasets also does not allow us to divide immigrants to smaller and thus more precise category of origin.

trol purposes). They are gender, age (in years), marital status (married = 1), urban versus rural residence (rural residence=1) and education (in years of formal schooling). The main dependent variable—participation in the economically active labor force—is constructed

as dummy variable distinguishing between those who did paid work during the seven days immediately prior to the interview versus all others. This variable, then, will serve as an indicator of the immigrant incorporation in the labor market.

5. Analysis and Findings

5.1. Descriptive Overview

In Appendix Table 2, we detail the mean characteristics of respondents by gender for Western Europe. The data provide information on the age distribution and educational attainment of different groups of immigrants in comparison with natives in Europe⁶. The average age of male and female migrants (either first- or second-generation) from European origin and those who are non-Muslim are quite similar to that of natives. By contrast, regardless of gender, the second generation of non-European migrants, and especially Muslims, are substantially younger than all other groups. We can attribute the age difference between persons of European origin (either native-born or immigrants) and non-European and Muslim immigrants, at least in part, to the relatively high level of fertility among the latter immigrant populations.

While the educational level of first-generation Muslim male immigrants

(11.9 years of schooling on average) is substantially lower than that of natives or other groups of immigrants, the educational level of second-generation Muslim immigrants (12.9 years of schooling on average) is only slightly lower than that of native-born and other immigrants groups (ranging between 13.05 to 13.6). The patterns of differences in education observed among various sub-groups of men are also found among women. However, unlike men, second generation immigrant women of non-European and Muslim background have reached parity in average years of schooling (13.8 and 13.3 years, respectively) with native-born and other immigrants groups.

In Table 1 we list the rate of labor force participation for each of the sub-groups by country, and in Figure 1 and Figure 2 we display the rate of active labor force participation (percent of those who are in paid work) for natives and for the different sub-groups of immigrants for men and women, respectively, in Western Europe as a whole. The data reveal minor differences across countries indicating a common

⁶ We checked these descriptive statistics also by country and found quite similar patterns across all countries.

pattern across Western Europe. More specifically, the data suggest that among men, the rate of labor force participation among second-generation is lower than that among natives and first-generation immigrants. Among women, the rate of labor force partici-

pation of second-generation immigrants is higher than that of first-generation immigrants, although the rate of labor force participation among immigrants is lower than among native-born European women.

Figure 1: Rate of labor force participation for men, by migrant status and ethnic origin/religion in Western European countries




Figure 2: Rate of labor force participation for women, by migrant status and ethnic origin/religion in Western European countries




Table 1: Rate of labor force participation, by gender, migrant status and ethnic origin/religion in Western European countries

	Natives	First generation non-European origin	First generation European origin	First generation Muslims	First generation non-Muslims	Second generation non-European origin	Second generation European origin	Second generation Muslims	Second generation non-Muslims
MEN									
Austria	72	48	74	63	70	59 ^a	72	47 ^a	76
Belgium	72	67	61	67	63	55	67	57	65
Switzerland	81	72	82	70	82	61	83	89 ^b	82
Germany	72	73	71	69	72	61	70	67	68
France	71	67	65	67	75	68	57	47	68
United Kingdom	75	78	77	83	73	58	79	48	68
Netherlands	80	75	66	62	78	70	72 ^a	42 ^a	79
Scandinavian countries ^c	81	68	79	63	77	50	80	54 ^a	76
WOMEN									
Austria	64	63	57	45 ^a	60	44	63	42 ^a	60
Belgium	59	45	56	27	56	33	59	24	59
Switzerland	68	56	63	48	64	73 ^a	74	37 ^a	75
Germany	62	39	52	31	52	45	66	47	64
France	63	47	57	43	57	56	55	45	61
United Kingdom	64	53	58	31	62	58	71	44	68
Netherlands	65	52	65	49	58	59	67	58	65
Scandinavian countries ^c	74	56	70	48	68	61	71	58	71

a. Less than 20 cases in the category

b. Less than 10 cases in the category

c. Denmark, Norway and Sweden

At the same time, some meaningful differences across sub-groups of immigrants are observed. Specifically, among men, second-generation immigrants of non-European origin and in particular, those of the Muslim faith have the lowest rate of active labor force participation (with average percent of employed 62.9 and 55.9, respectively). Differences in the rate of labor force participation by ethnic origin and by religion are much more pronounced among second-generation immigrant men than among first-generation immigrant men. Among women, these differences are quite similar for first- and second-generation immigrants, with a higher percentage of immigrant women of European origin and of non-Muslim affiliation joining the economically active labor force than other immigrant women. However, the rates of labor force participation among immigrant women of non-European origin and of the Muslim faith are higher in the second generation (54.5 and 45.2 respectively) than in the first generation (47.7 and 36 respectively).

The data (presented in Table 1) show common patterns across countries; patterns that are consistent with the data displayed in Figure 1 and Figure 2 for Western Europe as a whole. In all countries, second-generation immigrant men of non-European origin and, especially, those of the Muslim religion, are in the most disadvantageous position in terms of labor force participation as compared to all other sub-groups born in a coun-

try⁷. In all countries, the rates of labor force participation among second-generation non-European/Muslim immigrants are lower than that of first-generation non-European/Muslim immigrants, respectively⁸. As to the sample of women, rates of labor force participation among first-generation immigrants (regardless of origin and religion) do not reach the rates of native-born Europeans in all countries. As expected, the rate of participation in the paid economy among immigrant women of non-European origin and, especially, among those of the Muslim affiliation (regardless of generation) are lower than that of European and non-Muslim immigrants in all countries (with the exception of first-generation non-European women in Austria). Moreover, the rate of labor force participation among second-generation immigrant women of non-European origin and of the Muslim faith is still substantially lower than that of native women.

5.2. Methodology and estimation of the models

Although the data presented in Table 1 (and the Appendix tables) and in the figures are interesting, they do not pro-

⁷ The only exception is second-generation Muslim immigrants in Switzerland. However, because the number of cases in this category is extremely small (9), it cannot lead to a reliable estimate and can be the reason for the discrepancy.

⁸ Second-generation non-European immigrants in Austria are an exception; however, the number of cases in this category (13) is not sufficient to lead to a reliable estimate and can be the reason for the discrepancy.

vide accurate estimates of the relative odds to become a part of economically active labor force. Since the sub-groups of immigrants are characterized by different socio-demographic characteristics (and since differences in the odds to participate in economically active labor force reflect differences in human capital and socio-demographic attributes such as education and age), we estimate in the analysis that follows the effects of group origin, religion affiliation and generation on the odds to participate in active labor force (versus not to participate) net of variations in socio-demographic attributes of individuals.

To examine the relative net disadvantage (or advantage) of different groups of immigrants to become economically active as compared to natives, we estimated a series of logistic regression equations predicting odds to be active member of the paid workforce (versus not being an active member of the paid workforce) as a function of age, marital status, (rural) residence, education, and a series of dummy variables representing different sub-groups of immigrants (natives are the comparison category). The estimated coefficients for sub-group membership serve as indicators of the size of the net advantage (positive value) or net disadvantage (negative value) a group has in joining the economically active labor force in comparison to native-born Europeans. All models include a series of dummy variables for each country and a series of dummy variables representing the ESS round as control variables. The

models also include dummy variables representing those who are disabled or permanently sick and those who are on military or community service (to control for possible differences in these variables across groups).

By so doing we treat the labor markets in the ten ‘old immigration’ Western European countries as one Western European labor market (i.e., by estimating a fixed-effects model with a series of dummy variables representing countries). We adopt this analytical approach following the findings presented in the ‘Descriptive Overview’ section that revealed similar patterns of labor force participation rate for sub-groups of immigrants across the ten countries. In addition, limitations associated with sample size (especially the small numbers of second-generation non-European immigrants, and especially second-generation Muslim immigrants) do not allow us an estimation of separate models for each country. However, in order to test robustness of our results and to insure that they are not driven by a specific outlier country, we estimated ten additional sets of regressions; in each one of them, we excluded a different country from the analysis. We did not find any substantial differences between the results of the ten additional sets of regressions. This finding, indeed, provides additional support for the use of a fixed-effects regression model for Western Europe.

5.3. Multivariate Analysis

The results of multivariate analysis are presented in Table 2 and 3 for men and women respectively. Columns 1-3 of each table refer to lo-

gistic regression equations predicting odds to participate in economically active labor force (in other words, odds of becoming part of the paid workforce).

Table 2: Coefficients from logistic regressions predicting odds to be employed in Western European countries, men^a

	1	2	3
Constant	0.140	0.139	0.154
Age	-0.019* (0.001)	-0.019* (0.001)	-0.019* (0.001)
Married	0.988* (0.028)	0.997* (0.028)	0.998* (0.028)
Rural Residence	0.202* (0.027)	0.202* (0.027)	0.203* (0.027)
Years of Education	0.083* (0.004)	0.083* (0.004)	0.082* (0.004)
First generation immigrants	-0.175* (0.043)		
Second generation immigrants	-0.373* (0.062)		
First generation non -European origin		-0.209* (0.058)	
First generation European origin		-0.118 ^κ (0.062)	
Second generation non -European origin		-0.548* (0.088)	
Second generation European origin		-0.160 (0.091)	
First generation Muslims			-0.276* (0.085)
First generation non -Muslims			-0.118* (0.055)
Second generation Muslims			-0.811* (0.122)
Second generation non -Muslims			-0.226* (0.083)

a. Models also include a series of dummy variable for each country, a series of dummy variable for ESS rounds and dummy variables representing those who are disabled or

permanently sick and those who are in military or community service (coefficients are not presented) *p<0.05, &p=0.058

Table 3: Coefficients from logistic regressions predicting odds to be employed in Western European countries, women^a

	1	2	3
Constant	-0.833* (0.093)	-0.820* (0.093)	-0.797* (0.093)
Age	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)
Married	0.215* (0.023)	0.214* (0.023)	0.214* (0.023)
Rural Residence	0.097* (0.023)	0.095* (0.023)	0.098* (0.023)
Years of Education	0.107* (0.003)	0.107* (0.003)	0.105* (0.003)
First generation immigrants	-0.497* (0.036)		
Second generation immigrants	-0.224* (0.056)		
First generation non -European origin		-0.632* (0.052)	
First generation European origin		-0.348* (0.048)	
Second generation non -European origin		-0.437* (0.083)	
Second generation European origin		-0.001 (0.079)	
First generation Muslims			-0.970* (0.087)
First generation non -Muslims			-0.344* (0.043)
Second generation Muslims			-0.799* (0.122)
Second generation non -Muslims			0.089 (0.076)

a. Models also include a series of dummy variable for each country, a series of dummy variable for ESS rounds and dummy variables representing those who are disabled or permanently sick and those who are in military or community service (coefficients are not presented) *p<0.05

The data reveal that regardless of gender, odds to be employed tend to increase with education and to decrease with age; odds tend to be higher among

residents of rural areas and among married people. The data presented in column 1 reveal that, other things being equal, first- generation immigrants are

at a disadvantageous position in becoming part of the paid workforce relative to natives (as implied by statistically significant and negative coefficients). The relative disadvantage among first-generation immigrant women (in comparison to native women) is more pronounced than the relative disadvantage among first-generation immigrant men (in comparison to native men). As predicted by the classical assimilation model, second-generation immigrant women have enhanced odds for participating in the economically active labor force (in comparison to natives), odds that are considerably higher than that of first-generation immigrant women. However, the employment disadvantage among second-generation immigrant men (relative to natives) remains similar to that observed for first-generation immigrant men.

The data presented in columns 2 and 3 reveal some significant differences in the odds to participate in the economically active labor force among different ethnic and religious sub-groups of immigrants, especially among second-generation immigrants. Among men (Table 2), the relative odds of European and non-European origin first-generation immigrants to be employed (compared to that of natives) are quite similar. At the same time, while the odds of second-generation immigrants of European origin to join the paid workforce are similar to those of natives, the odds of non-European immigrants are significantly lower than that of natives even in the second genera-

tion. Moreover, the relative odds to participate in the economically active labor force among second generation non-European immigrant men (in comparison to natives) is lower than that among first-generation non-European immigrant men. By way of comparison, the employment disadvantage of second-generation Muslim immigrant men is particularly noticeable and quite pronounced (column 3 of Table 2).

These results lend support to the notion of segmented assimilation processes according to which immigrant groups of different ethnic and cultural origins would experience differential modes of incorporation into the labor market. The noticeably lower odds of joining the economically active labor force among second-generation Muslim immigrants as compared to the parity in these odds between second-generation European immigrants and natives may imply that sizable part of Muslim immigrant population do not integrate into the economy and society whereas European immigrants seem to integrate into the economy. It is important, however, to remember that the data allow us to provide only cross-sectional analysis where time is represented by synthetic generational comparisons.

The results for immigrant women (Table 3) are somewhat different from those observed for men, mostly concerning the comparison between first- and second-generation Muslim and non-European immigrants. The coefficients displayed in columns 2 and 3 (Table 3)

reveal that the odds of all first-generation immigrant groups to participate in the economically active labor force are lower than that of natives. At the same time, and as expected, the relative odds to join labor market among first-generation non-European and Muslim women are lower than that among European and non-Muslim women. By way of contrast, second-generation European and non-Muslim women achieve parity with native-born European women. That is, second-generation European and non-Muslim immigrants are not disadvantaged in attainment of paid work as evidenced by the insignificant coefficients of the variables represent-

ing these two sub-groups. Second-generation immigrant women of non-European origin and of the Muslim faith, however, are still disadvantaged with respect to labor force activity in comparison to native-born women, as evidenced in the negative and statistically significant coefficients representing Muslim and non-European sub-groups. Unlike the case of men, the relative disadvantage of second-generation Muslim and non-European women (in comparison to natives) to join the economically active labor force is smaller than that observed for first-generation Muslim and non-European women.

Table 4: Probabilities (in percent) of person with average characteristics (of one's sub-group) in Western Europe to participate in economically active labor force (to be on paid work), by gender, migration status, ethnic origin/religion and generation

	Probabilities
Native-born men	0.74
First generation European origin men	0.73
First generation non -European origin men	0.72
Second generation European origin men	0.70
Native-born women	0.64
Second generation non -European origin men	0.64
Second generation European origin women	0.63
First generation European origin women	0.56
Second generation non -European origin women	0.55
First generation non -European origin women	0.48

Table 4 presents in descending order the estimated probabilities to participate in the economically active labor force by gender, migration status, and ethnic origin. The probabilities are calculated on the basis of a mutual model for men and women together (the model is similar to model 2 in previous tables) and average values of each sub-group for all variables included in the models. The probabilities of native-born men with average characteristics to participate in economically active labor forces of Western European labor market are estimated to be 0.73. Among men (having average characteristics of one's sub-group), the lowest probabilities of taking part in the economically active labor force are estimated for second-

generation non-European immigrants (0.64). Actually, second-generation non-European immigrant men have virtually the same chance to be employed in a Western European labor market as native-born women (0.64) and second-generation European immigrant women (0.63). As expected, the lowest probabilities of participating in the economically active labor force are estimated for first- and second-generation non-European women (0.48 and 0.55, respectively). However, there are almost no differences in the probabilities for participation in the economically active labor force between second-generation non-European immigrant women (0.55) and first-generation European immigrant women (0.56).

6. Conclusions

This article constitutes the first attempt to investigate inter-generational patterns of immigrants' labor market incorporation in terms of labor force participation of different ethnic (as well as religious) groups across ten Western European countries. The results of the study strongly indicate that a process of segmented assimilation takes place in Western Europe. Patterns of labor force participation vary considerably across ethnic and religion immigrant groups in Western Europe. European immigrant men (either in first- or in second-immigrant generations) have quite similar odds to join economically active labor force as compared to natives. At the same time, immigrant men of non-

European origin and those of the Muslim faith (either first- or second-generation immigrants) are less likely to become economically active. The non-European and the Muslim immigrants seem to face greater disadvantages than others in becoming economically active. Moreover, despite substantial progress in educational attainments of second-generation immigrants, the relative odds of joining the economically active labor force for second-generation non-European and Muslim immigrant men are substantially lower than those of first-generation non-European and Muslim immigrants.

The disadvantageous position in ability to attain paid work is especially pro-

nounced among second-generation Muslim immigrant men. One may view these results as evidence of integration into the bottom segment of society along the lines delineated by the segmented assimilation model. Disadvantage experienced by second-generation Muslim (as well by non-European immigrant) men may be the trigger for the social unrests experienced by European cities (e.g., the riots and the social protest of (mostly second-generation) youth). Indeed, recent immigrants' riots in Europe have been often associated with poverty, high unemployment rates, social exclusion, and deprivation.

As to women, the present findings demonstrate that, for women in general, the rate of economic activity among first-generation immigrants (regardless of ethnic origin and religious conviction) is substantially lower than that of native-born European women. Among sub-groups of immigrant women the data reveal that the rate of labor force participation among second-generation immigrant women is higher than that of first-generation immigrants but lower than that of native-born European women. These results are in line with the logic underlying the classic assimilation theoretical model according to which assimilation tends to increase with passage of time in the host country. However, further analysis also reveals differences between ethnic and religious groups of immigrant women regarding rates of labor force participation. Second-generation immigrant women of

European background and of non-Muslim religions achieve similar odds in attaining paid work as native-born European women. By contrast, the odds of second-generation immigrant women of non-European origin and of the Muslim faith are still substantially lower than that of native-born Europeans. The lower probabilities to join the economically active labor force among second-generation non-European and Muslim women (despite their high level of education) are driven, at least in part, by traditional values and rules of seclusion that dominate the non-European and Muslim communities. That is, because a substantial part of non-European and Muslim women belongs to traditional ethnic groups, they are culturally more restricted in participation in the public sphere. Thus, in order to become economically active most of these women have to overcome cultural barriers and traditional gender roles endorsed by the ethnic community (see detailed discussion in Thomson and Crul, 2007). Indeed, the findings of the present research reveal that intergenerational patterns of immigrants' incorporation in the labor market not only differ by ethnic origin and religion background but also by gender.

In sum, despite being attracted to Western Europe by demand for workers, immigrants of non-European origin and Muslim faith in Western European countries, even in the second generation, are not fully integrated into the labor market of host societies. Immigrants are less successful than native-born Europeans in

joining the economically active labor force and in becoming an integral part of the economy and society. Indeed, these findings imply that immigrants and especially immigrants of non-European origin and of the Muslim faith, whether first- or second-generation, are disadvantaged in finding employment in the European labor markets. We believe that the relatively low probabilities of becom-

ing economically active observed among second-generation non-European and Muslim immigrants, especially in an era of rising anti-immigrant sentiment, may have significant consequences for future ethnic relations and social solidarity in Europe. These findings, then, are a valuable source for both policy makers and social scientists, and warrant further investigation.

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