Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

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dc.contributor.author Romero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.author Triossi, Matteo
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2010-09-17T12:56:13Z
dc.date.available 2010-09-17T12:56:13Z
dc.date.issued 2010-09
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/9275
dc.description.abstract This paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple applications to colleges and colleges sequentially decide the applicants to enroll. The irreversibility of agents decisions and the sequential structure of the enrollments make truthful behavior a dominant strategy for colleges. Due to these features, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a mechanism where colleges make proposals to potential students and students decide sequentially. We show that this mechanism implements the stable set as well.
dc.format.mimetype application/octet-stream
dc.format.mimetype application/octet-stream
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 10-18
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Stable matching
dc.subject.other Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
dc.title Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel C78
dc.subject.jel D78
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we1018
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