Peace agreements without commitment

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dc.contributor.author Beviá, Carmen
dc.contributor.author Corchón, Luis C.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-07-14T07:37:57Z
dc.date.available 2010-07-14T07:37:57Z
dc.date.issued 2010-03
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, 68, 2. p.469–487
dc.identifier.issn 0899-8256
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/9064
dc.description.abstract In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the “rich” country transfers part of its money to the “poor” country. But when the military proficiency of the “rich” country is sufficiently high the “poor” country stops the war by transferring part of its resources to the “rich” country. War cannot be avoided by transfers when inequality of resources is very large or the cost of war is sufficiently low.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © Elsevier
dc.title Peace agreements without commitment
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.012
dc.subject.jel C72; D74
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.012
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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