Democracy and the curse of natural resources

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Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem Cabrales, Antonio Hauk, Esther
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía 2007-07-10T07:58:30Z 2007-07-10T07:58:30Z 2007-06
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources. This is an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction into our political economy model: policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. Natural resources may be bad for democracy by harming political turnover. Our model also suggests a non-linear dependence of human capital on natural resources. For low levels of democracy human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high levels of democracy the dependence is reversed. This theoretical finding is corroborated in both cross section and panel data regressions.
dc.format.extent 1579233 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics;
dc.relation.ispartofseries 07-29
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.subject.other Curse of natural resources
dc.subject.other Democracy
dc.subject.other Political game
dc.subject.other Revolution
dc.subject.other Human capital
dc.title Democracy and the curse of natural resources
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel D72
dc.subject.jel H52
dc.subject.jel O13
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we075429
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