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Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
Abstract:
We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural
resources. This is an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior and incentives of
politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural
resources. This is an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior and incentives of
politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the
elections. This gives rise to a new restriction into our political economy model: policies should
not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to
revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. Natural resources may be bad for
democracy by harming political turnover. Our model also suggests a non-linear dependence of
human capital on natural resources. For low levels of democracy human capital depends
negatively on natural resources, while for high levels of democracy the dependence is reversed.
This theoretical finding is corroborated in both cross section and panel data regressions.[+][-]