Rewarding cooperation in social dilemmas

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Show simple item record Cuesta, José A. Jiménez Recaredo, Raúl José Sánchez, Ángel Lugo, Haydeé
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía 2007-06-12T09:32:01Z 2007-06-12T09:32:01Z 2007-06
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma. Thus, individuals confront a new dilemma: on the one hand, they may be inclined to choose the shared reward despite the possibility of being exploited by defectors; on the other hand, if too many players do that, cooperators will obtain a poor reward and defectors will outperform them. By appropriately tuning the amount to be shared we can cast a vast variety of scenarios, including traditional ones in the study of cooperation as well as more complex situations where unexpected behavior can occur. We provide a complete classification of the equilibria of the nplayer game as well as of the evolutionary dynamics. Beyond, we extend our analysis to a general class of public good games where competition among individuals with the same strategy exists.
dc.format.extent 401690 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 07-27
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.subject.other Reward
dc.subject.other Social dilemma
dc.subject.other Prisoner's dilemma
dc.subject.other N-player game
dc.title Rewarding cooperation in social dilemmas
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we075227
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