The importance of selection rate in the evolution of cooperation

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Show simple item record Pérez Roca, Carlos Cuesta, José A. Sánchez, Angel 2010-03-09T16:15:16Z 2010-03-09T16:15:16Z 2007-04
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation The European Physical Journal Special Topics, 2007, vol. 143, n. 1, p. 51-58
dc.identifier.issn 1951-6355 (Print)
dc.identifier.issn 1951-6401 (Online)
dc.description 8 pages, 4 figures.-- ArXiv pre-print available at:
dc.description Final publisher version available Open Access at:
dc.description.abstract How cooperation emerges in human societies is still a puzzle. Evolutionary game theory has been the standard framework to address this issue. In most models, every individual plays with all others, and then reproduces and dies according to what she earns. This amounts to assuming that selection takes place at a slow pace with respect to the interaction time scale. We show that, quite generally, if selection speeds up, the evolution outcome changes dramatically. Thus, in games such as Harmony, where cooperation is the only equilibrium and the only rational outcome, rapid selection leads to dominance of defectors. Similar non trivial phenomena arise in other binary games and even in more complicated settings such as the Ultimatum game. We conclude that the rate of selection is a key element to understand and model the emergence of cooperation, and one that has so far been overlooked.
dc.description.sponsorship This work is supported by MEC (Spain) under grants BFM2003-0180, BFM2003-07749-C05-01, FIS2004-1001 and NAN2004-9087-C03-03 and by Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) under grants UC3M-FI-05-007, SIMUMAT-CM and MOSSNOHO-CM.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer
dc.subject.other Selection Rate
dc.subject.other Cooperation
dc.subject.other Evolution
dc.subject.other Game Theory
dc.title The importance of selection rate in the evolution of cooperation
dc.type article PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Matemáticas
dc.identifier.doi 10.1140/epjst/e2007-00070-6
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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