Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics

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dc.contributor.author Pérez Roca, Carlos
dc.contributor.author Cuesta, José A.
dc.contributor.author Sánchez, Angel
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T12:07:08Z
dc.date.available 2010-03-09T12:07:08Z
dc.date.issued 2009-12
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Physics of Life Reviews, 2009, vol. 6, n. 4, p. 208-249
dc.identifier.issn 1571-0645
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/7191
dc.description 42 pages, 26 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 02.50.Le; 05.40.-a; 87.23.Ge; 87.23.Kg; 89.65.-s; 89.75.Fb.-- MSC2000 codes: 91A22; 91A43; 92D15.
dc.description ArXiv pre-print available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/0911.1720
dc.description Final publisher version available Open Access at: http://gisc.uc3m.es/~cuesta/papers-year.html
dc.description.abstract Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator equation, that describes mathematically the idea that those individuals performing better have more offspring and thus their frequency in the population grows. While very many interesting results have been obtained with this equation in the three decades elapsed since it was first proposed, it is important to realize the limits of its applicability. One particularly relevant issue in this respect is that of non-mean-field effects, that may arise from temporal fluctuations or from spatial correlations, both neglected in the replicator equation. This review discusses these temporal and spatial effects focusing on the non-trivial modifications they induce when compared to the outcome of replicator dynamics. Alongside this question, the hypothesis of linearity and its relation to the choice of the rule for strategy update is also analyzed. The discussion is presented in terms of the emergence of cooperation, as one of the current key problems in Biology and in other disciplines.
dc.description.sponsorship This work has been supported by projects MOSAICO, from the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, and MOSSNOHO and SIMUMAT, from the Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © Elsevier
dc.subject.other Evolutionary games
dc.subject.other Replicator dynamics
dc.subject.other Mean-field
dc.subject.other Fluctuations
dc.subject.other Spatial structure
dc.subject.other Network reciprocity
dc.subject.other Emergence of cooperation
dc.title Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2009.08.001
dc.subject.eciencia Matemáticas
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.plrev.2009.08.001
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
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